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Researchers have long used repeated cross sectional observations of homicide rates and sanctions to
examine the deterrent effect of the adoption and implementation of death penalty statutes.  The empirical
literature, however, has failed to achieve consensus.  A fundamental problem is that the outcomes
of counterfactual policies are not observable. Hence, the data alone cannot identify the deterrent effect
of capital punishment.  How then should research proceed?  It is tempting to impose assumptions strong
enough to yield a definitive finding, but strong assumptions may be inaccurate and yield flawed conclusions.
Instead, we study the identifying power of relatively weak assumptions restricting variation in treatment
response across places and time.  The results are findings of partial identification that bound the deterrent
effect of capital punishment.  By successively adding stronger identifying assumptions, we seek to
make transparent how assumptions shape inference.  We perform empirical analysis using state-level
data in the United States in 1975 and 1977.  Under the weakest restrictions, there is substantial ambiguity:
we cannot rule out the possibility that having a death penalty statute substantially increases or decreases
homicide.  This ambiguity is reduced when we impose stronger assumptions, but inferences are sensitive
to the maintained restrictions.  Combining the data with some assumptions implies that the death penalty
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jvp3m@virginia.eduEhrlich (1975, p. 398): “In fact, the empirical analysis suggests that on the average the tradeoff
between the execution of an offender and the lives of potential victims it might have saved was of
the order of 1 for 8 for the period 1933!1967 in the United States.”
Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin (1978, p. 62): “The current evidence on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment is inadequate for drawing any substantive conclusion.”
1. Introduction
Researchers have long used data on homicide rates and sanctions to examine the deterrent
effect of capital punishment.  There is now a large body of work addressing this controversial
question, yet the literature has failed to achieve consensus on even the most basic matters.  Donohue
and Wolfers (2005), who review a set of recent studies, provide a striking illustration.  They find that
a seemingly trivial change to the model estimated by Dezhbakhsk, Rubin and Shepard (2003) “flips
the sign of the original estimates: instead of saving eighteen lives, each execution leads to eighteen
lives lost.” 
Numerous shortcomings of the research were documented over thirty years ago in the report
of the National Research Council (NRC) Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects
(Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1978).  These problems persist in more recent work.  A fundamental
difficulty is that the outcomes of counterfactual policies are unobservable.  Data alone cannot reveal
what the homicide rate in a state without (with) a death penalty would have been had the state (not)
adopted a death penalty statute.  Here, as always when analyzing treatment response, data must be
combined with assumptions to enable inference on counterfactual outcomes.   Hence, research2
confronts the selection problem.
If available data alone cannot reveal the deterrent effects of capital punishment, how should
research proceed?  It is tempting to impose assumptions strong enough to yield a definitive finding.
When this is achieved, a deterrent effect is said to be point-identified.  Researchers often recognize
that strong assumptions may have little foundation, but they apply them nonetheless. They may
defend their strong assumptions as necessary to “provide answers.”  However, strong assumptions
may be inaccurate, yielding flawed and conflicting conclusions.  One of us has cautioned against the
imposition of untenable strong assumptions as follows (Manski, 2003, p. 1): 
The Law of Decreasing Credibility: The credibility of inference decreases with the strength
of the assumptions maintained.  
We have seen this repeatedly in the empirical literature on the death penalty.  
With this in mind, we study inference under various relatively weak assumptions that may
possess greater credibility.   The assumptions we study do not point-identify deterrent effects, but
they do partially identify them, yielding bounds rather than point estimates.  Analysis of partial
identification of treatment effects has developed and been applied over the past twenty years,
beginning with Manski (1990) and continuing through our present work.  See Manski (2003 and
2007) for textbook expositions.  Some applications include Manski and Nagin (1998), Manski and
Pepper (2000), Pepper (2000),  Blundell et al. (2007), and Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2011).
The basic insight of partial identification analysis is that identification need not be an all or
nothing undertaking.  Available data and credible assumptions may lead to partial conclusions.
Some may find this ambiguity frustrating and be tempted to impose strong assumptions in order to
provide definitive answers. We caution against such a reaction.3
We use data provided by Justin Wolfers at
1
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/DeathPenalty.shtml.  This archive reports annual state level
data from 1930 to 2004.  See Donohue and Wolfers (2005) for a detailed description. 
Imposing strong but untenable assumptions cannot not truly resolve problems of inference
on the deterrent effects of capital punishment.  The NRC Panel on Research on Deterrent and
Incapacitative Effects recognized this when it concluded that “research on this topic is not likely to
produce findings that will or should have much influence on policymakers” (Blumstein, Cohen, and
Nagin, 1978, p.63).  The lesson of past research is that researchers and policymakers must cope with
ambiguity.
To demonstrate partial identification analysis in a relatively simple setting, this paper
considers the problem of drawing inferences on the deterrent effects of death penalty statutes using
data from repeated cross sections of states.   We focus on the years following the 1972 Supreme
1
Court case Furman vs. Georgia, which resulted in a de facto moratorium on the application of the
death penalty, and the 1976 case Gregg vs. Georgia, which ruled that the death penalty could be
applied subject to certain criteria.  We examine the effect of death penalty statutes on the national
homicide rate  in two years: 1975, the last full year of the federal moratorium on death penalty, and
1977, the first full year after the moratorium was lifted.  In 1975 the death penalty was illegal
throughout the country, and in 1977 thirty-two states had legal death penalty statutes.  For each state
and each year, we observe the homicide rate and whether the death penalty is legal.
Table 1 displays the homicide rate per 100,000 residents in 1975 and 1977 in the states that
did and did not legalize the death penalty after the Gregg decision.  The former are the “treated”
states and the latter are the “untreated” ones.  Here and throughout the paper, we include the District
of Columbia and regard it as equivalent to a state.  When computing averages across states, we4
 DID estimates have been reported in numerous policy analyses, including evaluations of
2
the death penalty.  For example, Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) used the federal moratorium of
the 1970s as a ‘‘judicial experiment.’’ More broadly, they used data from 1960–2000 to compare
murder rates immediately before and after changes in death penalty laws. They concluded that the
death penalty has a substantial deterrent effect on homicides.  Examining the same questions using
the same data, Donohue and Wolfers (2005) concluded that there is no evidence that the death
penalty deters homicides.
weight each state by its population. The thirty-two states with legal death penalty statutes in 1977
contained seventy percent of the total population.
Table 1: Homicide Rates per 100,000 Residents by Year and Treatment Status in 1977
Group Total
Year Untreated Treated 
1975 8.0 10.3  9.6
1977 6.9 9.7   8.8
Total 7.5 10.0  9.2
The data in the table may be used to compute three simple estimates of the effect of death
penalty statutes on the national homicide rate.  A “before-and-after” analysis compares homicide
rates in the treated states in 1975 and 1977, yielding the estimate !0.6 (9.7 ! 10.3).
Contemporaneous comparison of 1977 homicide rates in the treated and untreated states yields the
estimate 2.8 (9.7 ! 6.9).  The difference-in-difference (DID) estimate  compares the time-series
changes in homicide rates in the treated and untreated states, yielding the estimate 0.5 [(9.7 ! 10.3)
! (6.9 ! 8.0)].
2
These three estimates yield different empirical findings.  Given certain assumptions, each
appropriately measures the effect on death penalty statutes on the national homicide rate.  However,5
the assumptions that justify this interpretation differ across estimates.  Moreover, one may think that
none of the requisite assumptions is credible.  
In Section 2, we formally define the empirical question and the selection problem.  Section
3 presents two polar approaches to inference.  At one pole, deterrent effects are point-identified
under strong assumptions needed to  justify the three estimates described above.  At the other, they
are partially identified using only the data and an a priori bound on the maximum possible value of
the mean counterfactual homicide rate.  No other assumptions are imposed to address the selection
problem.
Section 4 applies new results on partial identification developed in our companion technical
paper (Manski and Pepper, 2011).  These results exploit the variation of homicide rates and death
penalty status in repeated cross sections of states to explore middle ground assumptions.  By
successively adding stronger assumptions and determining their identifying power, our analysis
makes transparent how assumptions shape inferences about the effect of capital punishment on
homicide.
The assumptions that we consider restrict the potential variation of treatment response or
treatment effects over time and/or across states.  Under the weakest assumptions, there is
considerable ambiguity: we cannot rule out the possibility that the death penalty substantially
increases or decreases the mean homicide rate across states.  This ambiguity is reduced by imposing
stronger assumptions, but inferences are highly sensitive.  Given the available data, imposing certain
assumptions implies that the death penalty increases homicide but other assumptions imply that the
death penalty deters it.6
This paper does not provide measures of statistical precision when presenting our findings
on average treatment effects.  That is, we view the states in 1975 and 1977 as constituting the
population of interest, rather than as realizations from some sampling process.  One reason we do
this is expositional.  We want to focus attention on the identification problem arising from the
unobservability of counterfactual outcomes.  Statistical precision of estimates is a second-order
concern relative to this problem.
Another reason is that measurement of statistical precision requires specification of a
sampling process that generates the data, but we are unsure what type of sampling process would be
reasonable to assume.  Existing methods for computing confidence intervals in partial identification
analysis assume that the data are a random sample drawn from an infinite population; see, for
example, Imbens and Manski (2004) and Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007).  This sampling
assumption does not seem natural when considering states as units of observation.
2. Average Treatment Effects and the Selection Problem
We consider the problem of learning the effect of death penalty statutes on the national
homicide rate.  This is the population-wide average treatment effect (ATE)
dd d ATE   /  E[Y (1)] ! E[Y (0)]. (1)7
Here there are two mutually exclusive treatments: treatment t = 1 denotes a state sanctions regime
that includes the presence of a death penalty statute and t = 0 denotes one without such a statute.
Defining the treatment to be the presence or absence of a death penalty statute is a representation of
actual sanctions policy intended to simplify analysis.  While this comparison addresses a well-
defined question, the resulting analysis cannot reveal the mechanisms by which the statute impacts
crime. One might like to differentiate treatments by the specifics of the death penalty statute enacted,
the way it is implemented, and by the nature of the non-capital sanctions that a state has in place. 
d The outcome Y (1) denotes the homicide rate if a state were to have a death penalty statute,
d Y (0) denotes the analogous outcome if the state were not to have a death penalty statute, and d
d indicates whether the year is 1975 or 1977 ( = 0 if 1975, = 1 if 1977).  ATE  expresses how the
national homicide rate in year d would differ if all states were to have a death penalty statute versus
what would occur if all states had a death penalty moratorium.
We also consider inference on the effect of death penalty statutes on homicide in groups of
states with specified observed characteristics.  Let X denote these characteristics.  Then the objective
dX d d is to learn the group-specific average treatment effect ATE   /  E[Y (1)*X] ! E[Y (0)*X].
jd jd Notice that for each state j and year d, there are two potential outcomes, Y (1) and Y (0).
jd The outcome Y (1) is counterfactual for all states that did not have a death penalty statute in year
jd d, while Y (0) is counterfactual for all states that did have a death penalty.  The observed murder
jd jd jd jd jd jd rate is Y  = Y (1)@Z  + Y (0)@(1 ! Z ), where Z  = 1 denotes that state j has a death penalty statute
jd in year d and Z  = 0 otherwise.8
The fact that the data only reveal one of the two mutually exclusive outcomes constitutes the
selection problem.  Using the Law of Iterated Expectations, the implications for identification of
d E[Y (1)] can be seen by writing this quantity as 
d dd d dd d E[Y (1)]  =  E[Y (1)|Z  = 1]P(Z  = 1) + E[Y (1)|Z  = 0]P(Z  = 0). (2)
jd jd jd jd jd jd jd Each observation in the sample reveals Y (Z ), Z , and X .  (We will sometimes write Y  / Y( Z)
d for short.)  Hence, the sampling process identifies the selection probability P(Z  = 1), the censoring
dd d d probability P(Z  = 0), and the mean of Y (1) in states with the death penalty, E[Y (1) | Z  =1].  For
11 1 1 example, in 1977 we have E[Y (1)|Z  = 1] = 9.7, P(Z  = 1) = 0.70, P(Z  = 0) = 0.30.  However, the
dd d sampling process does not reveal the mean of Y (1) in states without the death penalty, E[Y (1)|Z
d = 0].  Thus, E[Y (1)] only partially identified by the data alone.
3. Polar Approaches to Inference
How might we proceed?  This section considers polar approaches.  One pole makes
assumptions strong enough to point-identify ATEs.  The other only assumes an upper bound on the
homicide rate, the result being wide bounds on ATEs.9
3.1. Assumptions that Point-identify Average Treatment Effects
At one extreme, researchers may impose assumptions strong enough to point-identify average
treatment effects.  This has been the norm in the literature, with researchers applying a variety of
assumptions.  In this section we give assumptions under which the three simple estimates mentioned
in the Introduction identify the effect of death penalty statutes on the national homicide rate.
3.1.1. Random Treatment Selection
jd A common assumption is that the realized treatments Z  are statistically independent of
potential outcomes, as they would be in a classical randomized experiment.  This implies that
11 d 11 d E[Y (1)]  =  E[Y (1)|Z  = 1] and  E[Y (0)]  =  E[Y (0)|Z  = 0].  The ATE in 1977 is point-identified
1d 1d under this assumption because E[Y (1)|Z  = 1] and  E[Y (0)|Z  = 0] are the observed mean homicide
rates in states that do and do not have the death penalty.
Combining this assumption with the data implies that the death penalty increases the mean
homicide rate by 2.8 per 100,000 (i.e., 9.7 ! 6.9) in 1977.  Without additional assumptions, the ATE
in 1975 is not identified.  The reason is that, with the federal moratorium in place, no states had the
death penalty during that time period. 
The random-selection assumption is credible in randomized experiments, but it is not
generally credible in observational studies where treatments (i.e., death penalty statutes) are self-
selected.  A particular concern is that states may adopt death penalty statutes in part based upon their
beliefs about the deterrent effect of such statutes. 10
3.1.2. Time-Invariant Treatment Response
jj 1 j Let X = 1 if state j is in the treated group (i.e., Z  = 1) and X = 0 if it is in the untreated
j1 group (Z  = 0).  Suppose that, within the group of treated states, mean treatment response is the same
10 in 1975 and 1977.  Thus, E[Y (@)|X = 1] = E[Y (@)|X = 1].  The data for 1975 and the fact that no state
had a death penalty statute that year imply that
00 0                         E[Y (0)|X = 1]  =  E[Y (0)|X = 1, Z = 0]  =  E(Y |X = 1, Z = 0).
The data for 1977 and the fact that only treated states had a death penalty statute that year imply that
11 1                         E[Y (1)|X = 1]  =  E[Y (1)|X = 1, Z = 1]  =  E(Y |X = 1, Z = 1).
Combining this with the assumption that mean treatment response does not vary over time for the
treated group implies that the time-invariant effect of treatment on the treated (ETT) is 
X=1 1 0 1 0   ETT  /  ATE   =  E[Y (1)|X = 1] ! E[Y (0)|X = 1]  =  E(Y |X = 1, Z = 1)  !  E(Y |X = 1, Z = 0).
The right-hand side is the estimate of deterrence given by before-and-after analysis of the treated
states.  The empirical finding with the data in Table 1 is !0.6 (9.7 ! 10.3).
Before-and-after analysis of the treated states only reveals the average treatment effect within
this group of states.  One cannot perform an analogous analysis for the untreated states because they
did not have a death penalty statute in either year.  One can interpret the before-and-after estimate11
as giving the effect of death penalty statutes on the national homicide rate if one thinks it credible
to assume that the effect of treatment on the treated equals the effect of treatment on the untreated.
However, the data in Table 1 make this interpretation suspect.  The data show that the homicide rate
in the untreated states fell from 8.0 in 1975 to 6.9 in 1977.  Thus, mean treatment response varied
with time in the untreated states.
3.1.3. Linear Homogeneous Treatment Response
A third assumption that point-identifies the ATE begins by posing a model of linear
homogeneous treatment response. Let
jd j jd Y (t)  =  " + $@d + (@t + * . (3)
The parameter ( measures the effect on the homicide rate of having the death penalty.  This effect
is assumed to be homogeneous across states j and dates d.  The date-specific intercept $@d shifts the
response function additively by date.  Observe that this intercept does not vary with the treatment
j t or across states j.  Similarly, the state-specific intercept " allows the response function to differ
jd additively by state.   The unobserved random variable *  varies across states and periods. 
Evaluated at realized values of treatments and outcomes, the model yields
jd j jd jd Y  =   "  + $@d + (@Z +  *. (4)12
The conventional practice is to impose distributional assumptions that point-identify (.  Here is one
assumption that achieves this objective.
jj 1 j As in Section 3.1.2, let X = 1 if state j is in the treated group (i.e., Z  = 1) and X = 0 if it is
j1 d d d in the untreated group (Z  = 0).  Assume that, for each date d, E(* *X, Z ) = 0 and E("*X, Z ) =
E("*X).  Then
dd d                                 E(Y *X, Z )  =  E("*X) + $@d + (@Z.
It follows that 
 
11 00 (  =   [E(Y *X = 1, Z  = 1) ! E(Y *X = 1, Z  = 0)] ! 
11 0 0 [E(Y * X =  0, Z  = 0) ! E(Y *X = 0, Z  = 0)]. (5)
Thus, the ATE is point identified.  The right-hand side of (5) is the DID form.  Given the model and
the data on homicide rates and executions summarized in Table 1, we find that the death penalty
statute increases the homicide rate in every state and date by 0.5.
The problem with this approach to identification is, again, credibility.  The linear
homogeneous response model in equation (3) is generally difficult to justify, as policies are typically
thought to have heterogeneous effects (Manski, 1990; Moffitt, 2005).  The distributional
assumptions used above in conjunction with the linear model are also hard to justify.  Instead,
researchers often apply instrumental-variable assumptions asserting that potential outcomes are
mean-independent of some observed covariate that is statistically associated with the realized13
treatment.  Finding instrumental variables that satisfy this condition, however, has proven to be
difficult in studies of the death penalty (Donohue and Wolfers, 2005).  
3.2. Partial Identification Assuming Bounded Outcomes
Imposing assumptions strong enough to yield a definitive finding is alluring, but strong
assumptions may be inaccurate, yielding flawed and conflicting conclusions.  Rather than attempt
to point-identify the ATE, partial-identification analysis does not impose the strong assumptions that
have been used in the literature.  Instead, we make weaker assumptions that yield bounds on the
deterrent effect of the death penalty.  Given the conflicting findings in the literature and the
methodological challenges in addressing the selection problem, deriving bounds under assumptions
that may be credible seems an important step forward.
A natural starting point is to ask what the data alone reveal about the ATE.  Recall that
d d dd d dd E[Y (1)]  =  E[Y (1) | Z  = 1]@P(Z  = 1)  + E[Y (1) |Z  = 0]@P(Z  = 0).
The selection problem arises because the data do not reveal the homicide rate if a death penalty
statute were in place for states where there was no such statute.  However, we do know that the
d homicide rate per 100,000 residents logically cannot be larger than 100,000.  Thus, Y (1) 0 [0,
dd 100,000] and, hence, E[Y (1) = 1| Z = 0] 0 [0, 100,000]. To put a more reasonable upper bound on
this counterfactual mean outcome, note that across all states and both years (1975 and 1977), the14
observed homicide rate always was in the range [0.8, 32.8].  Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that
dd E[Y (1)|Z  = 0] 0 [0, 35].
Using this upper bound, it follows that
dd d d d E[Y (1)  ]  0  {E[Y (1) | Z  = 1]@P(Z  = 1) + 0@P(Z  = 0),
dd d d                             E[Y (1) | Z  = 1]@P(Z  = 1) + 35@P(Z  = 0)} (6)
d Observe that the width of this bound increases with the censoring probability P(Z  = 0).  Thus, if a
d large fraction of states adopt death penalty statutes, the width of the bound on E[Y (1)] is relatively
d narrow.  In that case, the data do not reveal much about the distribution of Y (0), so the analogous
d bound on E[Y (0)] is wide.
Consider, for example, drawing inferences on mean potential outcomes during the
0 moratorium, when no states had the death penalty.  Hence, P(Z  = 0) = 1.  In this case, the data alone
provide no information on the mean outcome if all states were to adopt a death penalty, but they
point-identify the mean outcome if all states were to not have a death penalty.
The sharp bound on the ATE can be found by taking the appropriate difference between the
dd lower (upper) bound on E[Y (1)] and the upper (lower) bound on E[Y (0)] (Manski, 1990).  Given
the restriction that the counterfactual mean outcomes lie in the interval [0, 35], the width of the
bound on the ATE necessarily equals 35.  It follows that, in the absence of additional assumptions,
the data cannot reveal the sign of the effect of the death penalty on the murder rate.
Table 2 displays the bounds on the ATE for 1975 and 1977.  The data show that in 1977,
seventy percent of the population resided in states which legalized the death penalty.  In this year,15
the population weighted murder rate was 9.7 in states with the death penalty and 6.9 in states without
1 11 11 it.  Thus, P(Z  = 1) = 0.70, E[Y (1) | Z  = 1] = 9.7, and E[Y (0) | Z  = 0] = 6.9.  Thus, evaluation of
11 the bound in (6) shows that E[Y (1)] must be in the interval [6.8, 17.3] and E[Y (0)] must be in the
interval [2.1, 26.6].  These bounds on mean potential murder rates imply that the ATE must be in
the interval [-19.8, 15.2].
Importantly, these bounds are not a confidence interval – they do not express statistical
imprecision created by sampling variability.  Rather, the bounds express the ambiguity created by
the selection problem.  Assuming only that counterfactual mean potential murder rates cannot exceed
35, the data reveal that the ATE lies in the interval [-19.8, 15.2].  Recall that the ATE under the
random-selection assumption was 2.8, with before-and-after analysis was !0.6, and the DID estimate
was 0.5. 
Table 2 also derives bounds for 1975, a year in which no states had the death penalty.  In this
0 year, P(Z  = 1) = 0, so the data are uninformative about what the mean homicide rate would be if all
0 states had a death penalty statute.  However, the data point-identify E[Y (0)] = 9.6.  Thus, for 1975,
we find that the ATE must be in the interval [-9.6, 25.4].  While the bounds for 1975 are different
than those for 1977, both have a width of 35 and both include zero. 16
Table 2: Partial Identification of the ATE Under the Bounded Outcomes Assumption
1975 1977
d Probability of a Death Penalty Statute:  P(Z  = 1)  0 0.7
Murder Rate in States with the Death Penalty: 
dd E[ Y (1) | Z  = 1]
N. A. 9.7
Murder Rate in States without the Death Penalty: 
dd E[ Y (0) | Z  = 0]
9.6 6.9
Bounds:
d E[Y (1)] [0, 35] [6.8 , 17.3]
d E[Y (0)] 9.6 [2.1 , 26.6]
d ATE [-9.6, 25.4] [-19.8 ,15.2]
4. Middle-Ground Assumptions
The analysis of Section 3.2 made no assumptions that relate criminal behavior in 1975 and
1977.  Nor did it make assumptions that relate criminal behavior in states that did and did not enact
a death penalty in 1977.  Deterrent effects were permitted to vary across years and states.
One may reasonably believe that there is some commonality in criminal behavior across years
and states.  However, it is not credible to assume as much commonality as the linear homogeneous
model, which supposes that deterrent effects are the same in every year and every state.  This leads17
 Other authors have studied inference using assumptions that relax the linear homogeneous
3
model.  See Athey and Imbens (2006), Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, Hahn and Newey (2010) and
Evdokimov (2010).  Their assumptions and analyses differ considerably from what we present here.
us to consider “middle-ground” assumptions that presume some commonality across years or states,
but not homogeneity.  In particular, we apply new analysis of partial identification with repeated
cross-sections developed in Manski and Pepper (2011).
3
To begin, Section 4.1 permits treatment effects to vary across states but assumes that they
do not vary across years.  Section 4.2 adds an assumption that date-specific intercepts do not vary
across specified groups of states.  Section 4.3 assumes the existence of bounded instrumental
variables, which bound the variation of average treatment effects across groups of states. An
appendix explains the algorithms used to compute our empirical findings.
Our intent is not to endorse any particular assumption.  It is rather to demonstrate how the
the conclusions drawn depends on the assumptions imposed, thus providing a menu of possibilities
to readers of research on deterrence.
4.1. Date-Invariant Treatment Effects
We begin by assuming that the deterrent effect of the death penalty is the same in 1975 and
10 1977, in the formal sense that ATE  = ATE .  Then the date-invariant ATE must lie in the
intersection of the two date-specific intervals shown in Table 2, these being [-9.6, 25.4] and [-19.8,
15.2].  The result is [!9.6, 15.2].
While there remains much ambiguity about the deterrent effect of the death penalty, the
assumption of date-invariant treatment effects has identifying power.  It reduces the width of the18
bound on the ATE from 35 to 25.  This bound does not allow us to the sign of the ATE, but it does
rule out claims that the death penalty reduces the mean murder rate by more than !9.6 per 100,000
or increases it by more than 15.2.
The analysis below builds on this basic finding.  Section 4.1.1 introduces new notation and
uses it to re-derive the basic finding.  The payoff from introducing the new notation is that it
provides the basis for consideration of further assumptions.  Section 4.1.2 studies the additional
identifying power of placing a priori bounds on time-series variation in mean response levels.
Section 4.1.3 shows the further identifying power of placing a tighter priori bound on counterfactual
mean response levels than the [0, 35] bound assumed heretofore.
4.1.1. Basic Analysis
As earlier, suppose that one observes cross-sections of all the states including the District of
Columbia in 1975 (d = 0) and 1977 (d = 1).  Assume that mean treatment response at date d has the
form
10 E[Y (t)]  = E[Y (t)] + $.  (7)
Here  $ is a date-specific intercept that distinguishes mean response at dates 0 and 1.  Equation (7)
permits mean treatment response levels to vary across dates, but it assumes that the average
1100 treatment effect is invariant across dates.  Specifically, E[Y (1)] ! E[Y (0)] = E[Y (1)] ! E[Y (0)].
t0 To shorten the notation, let E / E[Y (t)].  Then (7) is equivalent to19
0t E[Y (t)]  =  E, (8a)
1t E[Y (t)]  =  E +$. (8b)
Equations (8a)!(8b) have identifying power because they reduce the number of unknown mean
d potential outcomes by one.  Without the assumption, we do not know the four quantities E[Y (t)],
01 d = 0, 1; t = 0, 1.  With the assumption, we do not know the three quantities (E , E , $).
To obtain the identifying power of the assumption, first consider each date-treatment pair
d (d, t) separately and obtain the identification region for E[Y (t)] using only the assumption of
dd bounded outcomes, as was done in Section 3.2.  Let this interval be called [L (t), U (t)].  Combining
this with (8a)!(8b), the available information is
0t 0 L (t)  #  E  #  U (t),                           t = 0, 1; (9a)
1t 1 L (t)  #  E + $  #  U (t),                     t = 0, 1. (9b)
01 Thus, the feasible values of the three unknowns ($, E , E ) are all the triples that satisfy the four
inequalities given in (9a)!(9b). 
dd Table 2 gives the values of [L (t), U (t)], d = 0, 1; t = 0 ,1.  Inserting these values in (9a)!(9b)
01 o 1 yields these findings for (E , E , $): $  0  [!7.5, 17.0], E   = 9.6, and E  0  [0, 24.8].  Hence, the date-
invariant ATE lies in the interval [!9.6, 15.2], as shown earlier by a more direct argument.20
4.1.2. Bounding Time-Series Variation in Mean Response Levels
The analysis of Section 4.1.1 placed no a priori restrictions on time-series variation in
treatment response levels between 1975 and 1977.  Some states could have become much more
prone to homicide over this period while others could have become much less prone to homicide.
We only assumed that the overall deterrent effect of the death penalty remains stable over time.
Our objective was to learn about the ATE, but we also found that assumption (7) and the data
implied a bound on the variation in mean response levels between 1975 and 1977, namely $ 0 [!7.5,
17.0].  Thus, mean potential homicide rates may have decreased by as much as 7.5 per 100,000 or
increased by as much as 17.0 per 100,000 over the three-year period.
One might not think it credible that such large variations in mean potential homicide rates
could  have occurred over such a short time period.  One might be willing to assume that $ must lie
in some narrower interval than [!7.5, 17.0].  Such an assumption may imply a narrower bound on
the ATE.
Consider, for example, the assumption that $ lies in the interval [!5.0, 3.0].  One might
motivate this assumption by the fact that the largest state-specific observed decrease in the homicide
rate between 1975 and 1977 was 5.0 and the largest observed increase was 2.9.  If one uses [!5.0,
3.0] as an a priori bound on $, application of (8) implies that the ATE lies in the interval [!5.8,
12.7], narrowing the bound  [!9.6, 15.2] derived earlier.
Alternatively, consider the much stronger assumption that $ = 0.  This assumption permits
individual states to experience time-series variation in their proneness to homicide, but it supposes21
that there is no national trend.  Combining this assumption with (8) implies that the ATE lies in the
interval [!2.8, 7.7].
Readers of research on deterrence may vary in their beliefs on the credible range of values
for $.  To enable readers to bring to bear their own beliefs and determine the implications for
inference on the ATE, the solid lines in Figure 1 display the bound on the ATE as a function of $.
The figure shows how a priori restrictions on $ reduce ambiguity about deterrence.  A person who
believes that $ # !3 can conclude that the ATE is positive; that is, the death penalty increases the
expected homicide rate.  In contrast, someone who believes that $ $ 8 can conclude that the ATE
is negative; that is, the death penalty deters crime. Someone who thinks that $ may lie in the interval
(!3, 8) cannot identify the sign of the ATE.2223
4.1.3. Tighter Bounds on Counterfactual Mean Response Levels
d We have thus far placed only a very weak bound on the counterfactual homicide rates E[Y (t)
d |Z   t], supposing that they must lie in the range [0, 35].  Of the 102 state-specific homicide rates
observed to occur in 1975 and 1977, the central ninety percent fall in the interval [2, 15]. Suppose
dd that one uses this interval as a bound on E[Y (t) |Z   t] rather than the earlier bound [0, 35].  Then
application of (8) implies that b 0 [!6.1, 3.0] and ATE 0 [!5.2, 5.4].
The dashed lines in Figure 1 display how the bound on the ATE varies with b.  Assuming
the tighter bound on mean counterfactual outcomes substantially narrows the bounds on the ATE
relative to those reported in Section 4.1.2.  Whereas the assumption $ = 0 earlier implied that ATE
0 [!2.8, 7.7], it now implies that ATE 0 [!2.2, 1.7]. A person who believes that $ < !2 can now
conclude that the ATE is positive, while one who believes that $ $2 can conclude that the ATE is
negative.
4.2. Date-Invariant Treatment Effects and Covariate-Invariant Date Intercepts
In Section 4.1, $ was the mean difference in potential murder rates between 1975 and 1975,
the mean being computed across all states in the nation.  Let X be a covariate that separates states
into K distinct groups, each group containing at least one state.  We now combine the assumption
of date-invariant treatment effects with the assumption that groups of states with different values of
X have the same date intercepts.  A stronger version of the assumption was made in the linear24
homogeneous model of Section 3.1, where it was assumed that states with different (covariate,
realized treatment) values share the same mean date intercepts. 
t*X0 Let E  / E[Y (t)*X].  Assume that
0t * X E[Y (t)*X]  =  E , (10a)
1t * X E[Y (t)*X]  =  E  + $. (10b).
This repeats assumption (7), now conditional on X, and also assumes that $ does not vary with X.
dd Repeating the earlier derivation, but now conditional on X, let [L (t*x), U (t*x)] be the bound
d on E[Y (t)*X] obtained using only the assumption that outcomes are bounded in the range [0, 35].
Combining this with (10a)!(10b), the available information is
0t * X0 L( t * X)  #  E  #   U( t * X),               t = 0, 1; all X (11a)
1t * X1 L( t * X)  #  E +  $   #   U( t * X),         t = 0, 1; all X (11b).
0*X1 * X Thus, the feasible values of the (2K + 1) unknowns ($,E , E , all X) satisfy the 4K inequalities
given in (11a)!(11b).
Given that $ does not vary with X or t, adding covariates provides additional identifying
information.  When K = 1, as in Section 4.1, there are three unknowns that satisfy four inequalities.
When K = 2, five unknowns satisfy eight inequalities.  When K = 4, nine unknowns satisfy sixteen
inequalities.  And so on.25
To illustrate, we evaluate the ATE with two definitions of X.  First, X indicates whether a
state does or does not have a death penalty statute in 1977; that is, whether it is treated or untreated.
Second, we let X indicate the location of a state in one of four mutually exclusive and exhaustive
census regions.  The derivation of findings in the latter case is not particularly revealing, so we omit
the details.  However, the former case is simple and yields an interesting analytical result.  Hence,
we give the derivation first before examining the empirical findings.
4.2.1. Treatment Group as the Covariate
When the covariate differentiates treated and untreated states, the effect of treatment on the
treated (ETT) is the DID estimate and the effect of treatment on the untreated (ETU) is partially
j j1 j j1  identified.  To see this, let X = 1 if Z  = 1 and X = 0 if  Z = 0.  The former are the treated states and
the latter are the untreated ones.  With this definition of X, the eight inequalities (11a)!(11b) become
0*00 0 * 01            E   =  E(Y *X = 0),          E  + $  =  E(Y *X = 0),
1*01 * 0             0  #  E  #  35,                   0  #  E +  $   #  35,
0*10 0 * 1             E   =  E(Y *X = 1),          0   #  E +  $   #  35,
1*11 * 11             0  #  E  #  35,        E  + $  =  E(Y *X = 1).
Given these bounds, the equalities in the first row point-identify the date intercept, with
10 $   =  E(Y *X = 0) ! E(Y *X = 0).26
 Manski and Pepper (2011) show that the DID form arises under a yet weaker assumption
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where the date-invariance restriction only applies to the Y(0) response function.  In this case, the
ETT is point-identified at date d = 1 but not at d = 0.
In our application, $ = !1.1.  Recall that, using only assumption (7) rather than (10), we could only
conclude that $ 0 [!7.5, 17.0].
With knowledge of $ and the full set of inequalities, it is straightforward to assess
identification of the four mean response values.  We find that
0*00 0 * 10 E   =  E(Y *X = 0), E   =  E(Y *X = 1),
1*01 * 11 E  0   [max(0, !$), min(35, 35 ! $)];  E   =  E(Y *X = 1) ! $.
Thus, the effect of treatment on the treated is point-identified, with
1*10 * 11 0 1 0 ETT  /  E !   E   = [E(Y |X = 1) ! E(Y |X = 1)] ! [E(Y |X = 0) !E(Y |X = 0)].
This is the DID form obtained earlier using the stronger assumptions of the linear homogeneous
model.
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The effect of treatment on the untreated is partially identified.  The data and assumptions
reveal that
1*00 * 00 0 ETU / E !   E  0   [max(0, !$) ! E(Y |X = 0),  min(35, 35 ! $) ! E(Y |X = 0)].27
4.2.2. Empirical Findings
Table 3 displays the empirical findings for the ETT, ETU and ATE under many of the
assumptions considered thus far.  Two conclusions warrant attention.
First, while incorporating covariates clearly tightens the estimated bounds on the ATE, there
remains much ambiguity.  For example, when census region is used as a covariate, the bound on the
ATE shrinks from [!9.6, 15.2] to [!9.0, 10.1].  Thus, while the ATE bound shrinks by nearly six
points, we still cannot determine whether the death penalty increases or decrease the national
homicide rate.
Second, when the treatment group is used as a covariate, the ETT is point-identified and
estimated to equal 0.5, but the ATE is only partially identified and estimated to lie in the interval
[!1.9, 8.3].  Researchers often loosely report the DID estimate as “the” effect of deterrence, without
being careful to state their maintained assumptions.  The ATE equals the DID estimate if one
assumes that the ETU equals the ETT, as is the case with the linear homogenous response model.
However, without this or another assumption that makes the ETU equal the ETT, using treatment
group as a covariate does not identify the sign of the ATE.28
Table 3: Treatment Effects with Date-Invariant Treatment Effects, with and without Covariate-
Invariant Date Intercepts
Assumption ETT ETU ATE
Linear Homogeneous Response 0.5 0.5 0.5
Bounded Outcomes, 1977 [!25.3, 9.7] [!6.9, 28.1] [!19.8,15.2]
Bounded Outcomes, 1975 [!35.0, 35.0] [!9.6, 25.4] [!9.6, 25.4]
Date-Invariant Treatment Effects
No Covariate [!9.6, 15.2]
Region as Covariate [!9.0, 10.1]
Treatment Group as Covariate 0.5 [!6.9, 27.0] [!1.9 , 8.3]
4.3. Bounded Instrumental Variables
The model introduced in Section 4.2 assumed common time-series variation in treatment
response across groups of states, but placed no restrictions on cross-sectional variation in treatment
response.  Traditional instrumental variables (IVs) assume that specified groups of treatment units
have the same mean treatment response or the same average treatment effects.  It often is difficult
to motivate such sharp assumptions, but it may be easier to motivate weaker assumptions asserting
that mean response or average treatment effects do not differ too much across groups.  We refer to
such assumptions as asserting the existence of bounded instrumental variables.29
To demonstrate the idea, we apply it here to group-specific average treatment effects.
Formally, we consider identification of the ATE when the researcher selects a non-negative constant
) and assumes that
xx N   | ATE  - ATE | # D  for all x and xN. (12)
This assumption bridges the gap between the linear homogenous model, which assumes that the ATE
is identical across all states j and dates d, and the model in (7) which allows the ATE to vary across
states.
When D = 0, inequality (12) gives a traditional instrumental-variable assumption asserting
that groups of states with different covariates have the same average treatment effect.  For example,
the ATE might be assumed to be the same across the two treatment groups or the four census regions
considered in Section 4.2.   The identifying power of this assumption was first analyzed in Manski
(1990), where the bound on the overall ATE was shown to be the intersection of the bounds on the
group-specific ATEs.
Letting ) > 0 weakens the traditional assumption by supposing that the ATE may differ
across groups by no more than ).  The larger the selected value of ), the weaker the assumption.
To assess the sensitivity of inference to choice of ), Figure 2 maintains the assumptions of Sections
4.1 and 4.2, adds assumption (12), and displays the bound on the ATE as a function of ).
Figure 2a takes the covariate to be the treatment group, treated or untreated.  The traditional
IV assumption () = 0) point identifies the ATE, revealing that the death penalty increases the mean
murder rate by 0.5.  This holds because the IV assumption implies that ETT = ETU.  However,30
ambiguity about the ATE increases with ).  Any value of ) larger than one renders it impossible to
sign the ATE.  For example, the bounds on the ATE when ) = 2 and ) = 5 are [!0.3, 0.9] and [!1.2,
1.8] respectively.  Still, these bounds are substantially more informative than the bound of [!1.9, 8.3]
reported in Table 3.
Figure 2b takes the covariate to be the census region.  Setting ) = 0 assumes that all four
regions have the same ATE.  This implies that the overall ATE lies within the interval [!7.6, 1.8].
Setting ) = 2 implies that the ATE lies in the interval [!8.6, 3.2].  Recall that without this restriction
linking the ATE across the four regions, we earlier found that the deterrent effect of the death penalty
lies in the interval [!9.0, 10.1].
The bound on the ATE using census region as a bounded instrumental variable can be further
narrowed if one brings to bear information on the date intercept $.  Figure 3 displays the bound as
a function of $ in the most restrictive case where the ATE is assumed to be the same across all four
regions; that is, ) = 0.  This assumption implies that $ 0 [!2.4, 7.0].  Prior knowledge of the value
of $ within this range substantially narrows the bounds on the ATE.  In fact, the ATE is nearly point
identified if a person knows the exact value of $.  For example, the ATE = 0.4 if $ is known to equal
!1.0, the value found when treatment group is used as the covariate.  And the ATE = !1.6 if $ is
known to equal 1.0.  Moreover, a person who believes that $ is less (greater) than  !0.5 can conclude
that the ATE is positive (negative).  These strong conclusions, however, require sufficiently strong
prior information on ) and $.  Someone who thinks that $ lies in an interval that includes !0.5 or
that the ATE across regions may differ (i.e., ) > 0) cannot necessarily identify the sign of the ATE.313233
5. Conclusion 
Readers of the 1978 report of the NRC Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative
Effects (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1978) will not be surprised by the persistent problems
researchers have had in providing credible inference on the deterrent effect of the death penalty.  The
NRC report warned the research community of the fundamental shortcomings of the data and
methods, and questioned whether empirical research could provide useful information at all.
Despite these warnings, various researchers have continued to examine the same or more
recent data using the same or similar methods.  To yield point identification, research continues to
combine data with untenable assumptions.  Yet, as in 1978, the results have been found to be highly
sensitive to these assumptions and no consensus has emerged.  As we see it, the research has failed
to provide meaningful answers. 
Given that deterrence remains an important and controversial question, it seems useful to
consider alternative methodological paradigms.  This paper has demonstrated some of what can be
learned about the deterrent effect of the death penalty under relatively weak assumptions.  In
particular, we have studied the identifying power of assumptions restricting variation in treatment
response across places and time.  The results are findings of partial identification that bound the
deterrent effect of capital punishment.
By successively adding stronger identifying assumptions, the analysis makes transparent how
assumptions shape inferences.  If one assumes only that outcomes are bounded, one cannot identify
the sign of the average treatment effect and one can only draw weak conclusions about its magnitude.
Those who find it credible to make further assumptions can obtain more informative findings.34
Imposing certain assumptions implies that adoption of a death penalty statute increases
homicide, but other assumptions imply that the death penalty deters it.  Thus, society at large can
draw strong conclusions only if there is a consensus favoring particular assumptions.  Without such
a consensus, data on sanctions and murder rates cannot settle the debate about deterrence.  However,
data combined with weak assumptions can bound and focus the debate.  See Manski and Nagin
(1998) for similar analysis of the effect on recidivism of alternative sentencing of juvenile offenders.
To demonstrate partial identification analysis in a simple setting, this paper used only two
years of data (1975 and 1977) and compared two broad treatments (the presence or absence of a
death penalty statute).  Future work can exploit richer data.  Whereas the traditional DID framework
uses only two periods of data, the approach developed in Manski and Pepper (2011) can exploit
multiple periods.
Future work can also use more refined definitions of treatments. One might differentiate
treatments by the specifics of the death penalty statute enacted, the way it is implemented, and by
the nature of the non-capital sanctions that a state has in place. Using more detailed treatment
measures may enable one to study how the specifics of sanctions regimes influence homicide. 
We caution that examining more refined treatments can further complicate identification.
All else equal, the selection problem intensifies as one refines the definition of treatments.  This
occurs because the probability that a person receives a refined treatment is necessarily no larger than
and typically is smaller than the probability of receiving an aggregated treatment.  Refinement of
treatment definition may also raise measurement issues.  Whereas the presence or absence of a death
penalty statute is straightforward to measure, more refined features of sanctions regimes may be less
readily observed.35
Finally, future work might address the problem of measuring statistical precision.  We noted
in the Introduction that measurement of statistical precision requires specification of a sampling
process that generates the data.  However, we are unsure what type of sampling process is reasonable
to assume when the data are a repeated cross-section of states.  Existing methods for statistical
analysis in settings of partial identification assume that the data are a random sample drawn from
an infinite population, but this sampling assumption does not seem natural when considering states
as units of observation.36
Appendix: Computation of Bounds on the ATE under Middle-Ground Assumptions
We used linear programming simplex algorithms coded in Gauss V11 to compute the feasible
values of the unknown parameters in (11a)!(11b).  For this application, these algorithms are
equivalent to a straightforward two step computational method.  The first step derives the feasible
values of $ as the intersection of 2K bounds, each obtained by differencing the bounds on mean
1*X response at dates 0 and 1.  The second step computes the feasible values of E  as the intersection
1*X0 * X of the dates  0 and 1 bounds on E , where the date 1 bounds follow directly from (11b).  E  is
point identified using data from date 0. 
To illustrate, consider the basic no-covariate date-invariant treatment effect model in Section
01 4.1. The feasible values of the three unknowns ($, E , E ) are the triples that satisfy the four
01 inequalities given in (9a)!(9b).  Equation (9a) provides initial (non-sharp) bounds on E  and E .  In
0 1.  particular, data from date 0 point identify E  and provide no information about E  
01 Given this initial information on (E , E ), the first step is to derive feasible values of $.
Differencing (9a) and (9b) yields two sets of bounds on $, one for each value of t:  
10 1 0 L (t)  ! U (t)  #  $  #  U (t) ! L (t),  t = 0, 1. (13)
Given that $ does not vary across treatments, it must lie in the intersection of the bounds for t = 0
LU and t = 1.  Let {$ , $ } denote the lower and upper intersection bounds on $. 
1 Given these bounds on $, the second step is to update the bounds on E . Equation (9) implies
01 0 1 two distinct bounds.  From (9a), we know that L (1) # E #  U (1) and, from (9b), we have L (1) !37
U1 1 L 1 $   #  E #  U (1) ! $ .  Given that E  does not vary across dates, it must lie in the intersection of
these two bounds. 
Further iterations provide no additional information about the feasible values of the
1 parameters.  Consider, for example, using the updated bounds on E  to further refine the bounds on
11U $ .  Focusing on the potentially interesting case where the intersection bounds on E  are {L (1) ! $ ,
1L U (1)  !  $ }, we see that
1 1L 11U L (1)  ! U (1) + $    #  $  #  U (1) ! L (1) + $ .
LU This lower bound is smaller than $  and the upper bound is larger than $ .  Hence, iteration yields
no improvement.
We use the same two-step approach to derive bounds on the 2K + 1 unknown parameters in
date-invariant models with covariates. When evaluating the feasible values under the bounded
instrumental variable model, values of $ which are inconsistent with inequality (12) are classified
as infeasible. 38
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